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In debating the question of animal liberation it has 
been my experience, if! may paraphrase Frey, that most 
people feel that (normal) human life is ofa much higher 
quality than animal life and that since the value of life 
is a function of its quality, animal life does not have the 
same value as (normal) human life. Indeed, most people 
feel that we are something of a special or a privileged 
class against which the lives of others are viewed and 
their value assessed. I 
It is not surprising that we feel this way. As Donald 
Griffin has pointed out, "it seems plausible that animals 
would be more likely to survive and reproduce if their 
beliefs included confident faith in their own superiority 
and the assurance that exploiting other species was 
normal and correct behavior."2 Historically, religion, 
literature, and philosophy have been extensively 
engaged in reinforcing this instinctual faith in the pre-
eminent worth and privilege of humanity. It has been 
their task to find and warmly extol those things which 
distinguish us from those "mere animals" we want to 
drive off the land, kill, eat, wear, and otherwise exploit 
and destroy to fulfill our needs and wants. It has been 
their job to keep our consciences clear as we bestride 
the world, using our overwhelming might to take 
control, mold the world to satisfy our idea of the good 
life, and kill off those who stand in our way. Self-
fulfillment, accomplishing our plans, achieving our 
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purposes-again to use Frey's1anguage and emphasis---
that is what we want, and many philosophers have 
bravely stepped forward to reassure us that since the 
quality and value of (normal) human life are 
"incomparably beyond" those ofany mere animal, "the 
way is open" for us to kill these inferior life forms as 
we need and want to in pursuit of the wonderfully "rich, 
full life" of a (normal) human being.3 
Autonomy is something we humans have frequently 
felt we were unique in possessing, and our philosophers 
have repeatedly reminded us how pre-eminently worthy 
being autonomous makes us. According to Frey, 
autonomy gives a "further dimension of value to our 
lives" by adding the happiness of a "strong sense of 
achievement" to what would otherwise be a "mere 
record of the satisfaction of fIrst-order desires and 
appetites."4 Frey thus gives a hedonistic reason for 
believing that autonomous beings are more valuable 
than nonautonomous beings. One could also (or 
alternatively) offer deontological and altruistic reasons 
for that evaluation: Kantians claim that only 
autonomous agents are capable of recognizing and 
acting out of respect for the moral law, and utilitarians 
could argue that only autonomous agents are capable 
of escaping the repetitive cycles of nature to improve 
the general welfare. Such reasons raise a myriad of 
questions, including the one with which Professor 
Comstock has dealt: Does autonomy, as Frey has 
characterized it, have the "crucial moral signiflcance"s 
he attributes to it? I have three contributions I would 
like to make to that line of questioning. 
First, Bentham noted seven dimensions of hedonistic 
values: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, 
fecundity, purity, and extent.6 Like John Stuart Mm, in 
chapter II of Utilitarianism, Frey wants to add an eighth 
dimension, quality, to this list. However, he does not-
in his writings with which I am familiar--explain how 
this eighth dimension relates to the other seven. Would 
he have it, as Mill did, thatthe accomplishment ofeven 
one little reflective project is preferable to even the 
greatest fulfillment ofunreflective desires and appetites? 
For example, would Frey maintain that the sense of 
achievement at completing one's plans to clean out the 
rain gutters is preferable to any amount ofpleasure from 
sex, fine wine, good food, or other sensual sources? If 
so, he has a heavy burden ofjustifIcation to shoulder in 
order to render such an incredible conclusion credible. 
But ifnot, then there may be autonomous lives that are 
not as valuable as nonautonomous lives filled with 
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reliable, ready-to-hand, pure, intense, enduring, fecund, 
or extensive happiness. Thus, Frey must either embrace 
some incredible comparisons or concede that a sense 
of achievement need not make a life something of 
immensely greater value than a life of satisfied desires 
and appetites. 
Second, dedicated empiricist that he was, Mill held 
that the only way to tell whether X is qualitatively 
superior to Y is to ask someone who has experienced 
both which she prefers. But no one can experience 
both an autonomous and a nonautonomous life. 
Consequently, unless a credible, nonexperiential way 
ofassessing the quality of life can be found, the question 
of whether an autonomous or nonautonomous life is of 
greater quality and value is unanswerable and, many 
would conclude, therefore cognitively meaningless. 
Sometimes the meaninglessness of comparing the 
quality of autonomous and nonautonomous lives goes 
unrecognized because a nonautonomous life, i.e., the 
life of a being lacking the capacity for autonomy, is 
confused with a life in which a being capable of 
autonomy is not able to actualize that potentiality. For 
instance, a person who spends part of her life dominated 
by strong-willed parents but who eventually goes on to 
hold her own values and way of life may report that 
she prefers the latter, self-determined way of life. And 
this may be cited as evidence that an autonomous life 
is preferable to a nonautonomous life. But that would 
be a category mistake: In discussions of human vs. 
nonhuman lives, the contrast between autonomy and 
nonautonomy refers to differing capacities, whereas the 
alternatives in the case of the liberated woman refer to 
different actualizations of the same capacities. 
Therefore, what a human being can report on, namely, 
the undesirability of a life in which her capacities for 
autonomy go unfulfilled, is irrelevant to determining 
whether an autonomous, human life is preferable to a 
nonautonomous, animal life, since the latter is a life 
led by a being who is incapable of autonomy and, 
consequently, can have all his capabilities fulfilled in a 
nonautonomous life. 
Let me pursue this crucial point a bit further, with 
an eye to the origin of values. When something is said 
to have value, it is always meaningful to ask, "For 
whom?" So, for whom is the value of an autonomous 
life greater than that of a nonautonomous life? Frey's 
answer is, apparently, for some moral philosophers, 
especially some Anglo-American moral philosophers. 
Now, this evaluation, if arrived at reflectively at all, 
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must have been arrived at by these people either (1) 
imagining how it would feel to live the life of a dog, a 
chicken, or some other nonautonomous being (the dog 
and chicken are Frey's candidates for nonautonomy7) 
or (2) contemplating these nonautonomous lives the 
way one would a tree, painting, or other object and 
noting the properties those lives have when thus 
externally examined. 
If the evaluation is based on how these philosophers 
imagine they would feel if they had to live a dog's 
life, then these philosophers are employing their 
imaginations to commit the same sort of category 
mistake discussed above. The image one has here is 
that of a prisoner, a consciousness which is capable of 
doing a variety of things confined to a way of life which 
does not permit her to actualize those capacities, 
although she remains aware of these capacities and feels 
frustrated by the lack of opportunity to actualize them. 
However touching, this image has nothing to do with 
the actual, lived quality and value of the life of a dog. 
The actual,lived quality and value of a way oflife must 
(logically) be the quality and value that way of life was 
for the individual actually living it. Consequently, if 
we hold, as seems reasonable, that the quality and value 
of a way of life depend on how it fulfills or frustrates 
capabilities, we must remember that the relevant 
capabilities are those of the individual actually living 
the life. For example, it is how a dog's way of life 
actually fulfills or frustrates the dog's capacities, not 
how it would fulfill or frustrate the capacities of some 
Anglo-American philosopher, that contributes to its 
actual, lived quality and value. 
It follows that to determine whether a human life 
actually has higher Iived quality and value than a dog's, 
one must compare the quality and value the human life 
has for its human subject with the quality and value the 
dog's life has for its canine subject. Colloquially, in 
order to determine whether the happiness of a happy 
human life is of a quality superior to the happiness of a 
happy canine life, we would need to compare the 
happiness our way of life provides us with the happiness 
the dog's way of life provides the dog. In order to make 
that comparison, we would have to feel the happiness 
the dog derives from his life and compare that with the 
happiness we derive from ours. Since we are not dogs, 
we cannot do that. Although we can tell, from his 
behavior, that a dog is happy, we cannot feel the 
happiness of a happy dog and, consequently, cannot 
compare its quality to that of the happiness we 
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experience. For example, since we cannot feel the dog's 
excitement at running along the beach, we cannot 
compare the quality of his happiness to the quality of 
our sense of fulfillment at solving a tricky logic problem 
and determine which is the qualitatively superior 
happiness. Consequently, we cannot tell whether a 
fulfilling life for a dog is qualitatively less happy than 
a fulfilling life for a human. Thus, assertions that a 
human life possesses superior actual, lived quality and 
value must (logically) be merely confused, rhetorical 
flourishes, devoid of cognitive content.8 . 
But it may not be actual, lived quality and value 
that Frey and his fellow anthropophiles have in mind. 
When they assert that autonomous life has a higher 
quality and value than nonautonomous life, they may 
mean merely that it has a preponderance of the qualities 
they prefer. The situation would be like that of someone 
who holds that the music of Beethoven is qualitatively 
superior to that of the Beatles: the valuer has certain 
qualities he prefers in music, and he finds more of 
them in Fidelio than in The Yellow Submarine. On 
this interpretation, when Frey's Anglo-American 
philosophers hold that autonomous life is qualitatively 
superior to nonautonomous life, this is to be understood 
. as asserting that these philosophers have certain 
qualities they prefer in a way of life, and they find 
more of them in autonomous than in nonautonomous 
ways of life. 
Now, we philosophers have long believed that we are 
"the measure of all things," smugly certain that "the 
unexamined life is not worth living" and that Socrates 
and his acolytes through the centuries have most closely 
approached the ideal human life and, consequently, the 
ideal of all life. Nevertheless, the conceit of holding that 
"the way is open" to killing others because their way of 
life does not possess the qualities preferred by a group of 
moral (!) philosophers is particularly appalling. As 
Comstock has shown, and Christ, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, 
Faulkner, and many others confirm, Frey's preferences 
are not shared by all normal, adult humans, nor even by 
all humans who have reflected sensitively on the human 
condition. They are doubtless not shared by nonauton-
omous beings. Given this diversity of preferences, it 
would seem incumbent on Frey-especially since he 
wants to make the qualities he prefers into life-or-death 
criteria-to demonstrate that his preferences are the 
"true," "basic," "superior," or otherwise definitive criteria 
for evaluating the quality and value of life. I am not 
aware that he has even attempted to do this. 
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Based on the discussions of moral relativism I have 
published elsewhere,9 I would argue that such a 
demonstration cannot be provided. Since values depend 
on valuers for their existence and since valuers are so 
diverse, there is no nonarbitrary way of showing that 
what one group of valuers prefers in life provides the 
"true," "basic," "superior," or otherwise definitive 
evaluation of lives. Nonarbitrary comparisons of the 
quality and value ofways of life are limited to evaluating 
alternative ways of life for the same (sort of) subject, 
as when we determine that life in a battery cage is less 
fulfilling for chickens than a free-roaming life or that 
spontaneous, intuitive lives are less fulfilling for Anglo-
American philosophers than are self-controlled, 
reflective lives. 
Finally, at one point Frey does go beyond warmly 
reciting his preferences to offering us one reason why 
autonom y is of "crucial moral significance in killing:" 
An autonomous being is "able to see itself as existing 
over time, able to have desires with respect to the 
future, including the desire to go on living, and able, 
therefore, to have these desires frustrated. "10 
Apparently, Frey intends "crucial moral significance" 
here to mean something like "necessary condition for 
making killing morally significant," since he 
concludes that "the way is open" to killing those who 
lack the ability to have such desires and to experience 
such frustration. 
Since I have refuted this sort of contention at length 
elsewhere,l1 let me here just quickly mention one 
serious, logical problem with it. The difficulty is that 
even if frustrating plans for the future and a desire to 
live are morally significant matters, it does not follow 
that depriving a nonautonomous being of the rest of its 
life, thereby depriving it of any chance at further 
happiness, is not also a morally significant matter. 
Therefore, it does not follow that "the way is open" to 
killing nonautonomous beings. 
This may be overlooked, since using the word 
"frustrated" suggests that killing autonomous beings is 
morally crucial because they experience feelings of 
frustration at having the fulfillment of their desires 
blocked by being killed. Nonautonomous beings, 
supposedly lacking plans for the future, could not 
experience such feelings of frustration at being killed. 
However, such an analysis of the moral significance of 
killing would open the way to killing autonomous 
beings in ways which do not cause them feelings of 
frustration, e.g., killing them in their sleep. Since that 
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is, presumably, an unacceptable conclusion, the moral 
significance of killing autonomous beings must lie in 
the blocking of the fulfillment of their desires, whether 
or not they realize those desires are being blocked. This 
suggests that there is not a morally crucial difference 
between killing a being with desires for the future and 
killing a being lacking such desires. 
In conclusion, I would like to comment on the idea 
that because there is a "further dimension of val ue to 
our lives,"t2 "the way is open to the killing of animals." 
It is not obvious that A's being superior to B entitles A 
to kill or otherwise exploit B. The teachings of Christ 
and the extra burdens placed on the philosopher-kings 
ofPlato's Republic suggest the contrary. Consequently, 
"firmly resisting any egalitarianism over the value of 
life"t3 should (logically) not be confused with opening 
the way to killing or otherwise exploiting animals. 
Justifying that opening requires not only demonstrating 
superiority, which Frey has tried but failed to do; it also 
requires demonstrating that superiority provides a 
license to exploit and kill, which Frey has had the good 
sense not even to try to do. 
II See S. F. Sapontzis, "Must we Value Life to Have a 
Right to It?," Ethics and Animals 3/1 (1982), and Morals. 
Reason, andAnimals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1987), chapter 9. 
t2 Frey, p. 56. 
13 Frey, p. 56. 
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